On the territory of the independent Croatian State Ustaschi and Germans unleashed a reign of terror and murder which was specifically aimed at Communists, other anti-fascists, Serbs and Jews [. . .] The goal of the Ustascha persecution of Jews and Serbs was to "catholicize", deport or liquidate them. This policy was executed by means of forced naturalisation, forced conversion and the compulsory registration of Jewish property. 2 Twenty-six years later Tudjman, now a ultranationalistic separatist, legitimized these very events in a well-publicized book. He wrote that the building of "Hitler's New European Order" was justified on the grounds of mutual need on the part of occupiers and collaborators alike; so too was the removal of the Jews (more or less unwanted in all European countries) as well as the correction of that Anglo-French transgression -the Versailles Treaty [.. .] In the mid-80s, World Jewry thought fit to remind us of its "Holocaust" and even went so far as to attempt to prevent Karl Waldheim, the former General Secretary of the UNO, from being elected President of Austria. 3 Since then Tudjman has got himself elected President of Croatia. No other historian has attained such heights, although in a time-span of 20-25 years quite a few historians have completed a full about-turn in their evaluation of the fascist past in their own countries and in Europe generally. Since the end of the 1970s they have provided an essential intellectual contribution to Jugoslav irredentism. In the Baltic States and the Ukraine former collaborators of the German occupation and liquidation administrations have been rehabilitated, due to the propaganda of the collaborators themselves. This was initiated in the early 1980s in exile and also found support in the writings of internationally-known historians. 4 In the German Federal Republic, Ernst 432
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Alongside these right-wing, populistic and revisionist tendencies we can observe for some time within the irredentist groupings of European neo-fascism publicists who employ historical arguments -renegades, young careerists, irredeemable Nazis. 10 In so far as they were collaborators in the years of the "real socialist" regimes, they have since returned to their countries of origin or -in the case of Germany and Austriafought their way in the last few years to the forefront of "respectable" journalism. The most important German equivalent of a group pledged to rehabilitate the collaborators of European fascism can be found among former junior officers who served in German military counter-intelligence or the Waffen-SS. They propagate the Nazi doctrine of a "Europe of the Peoples" -under German domination, of course -as an excellent model for future development. In this respect the ideas emanating from the Central Office of the SS (SS-Hauptamt) in the years 1943-1944 have gained a certain notoriety and are presented as an alternative to Maastricht: "European passports", "Federal Plans" (Hans Werner Neulen).
FROM REVISIONIST HISTORICAL PROPAGANDA TO THE SYSTEMATICS OF SCIENTIFICALLY-BASED REHABILITATION
Since the "Historikerstreit" we can see from the work of Neulen or Nolte that revisionist historical propaganda is steadily gaining ground in Germany. Nolte, for example, justified fascist mass-extermination policies as being reactive, anti-Bolshevik tactical moves in the "logical" strategy of a "European Civil War". 12 While the affirmative framework of such propaganda can hardly be overlooked, there are considerable differences of opinion regarding the preference for one form of fascist domination over another in presenting solutions for the present "system crisis". All such currents have the following in common: a strong tendency to racialist escalation, to projecting social conflicts inwards ("ethnicization of social questions"); laying claims to participation in undemocratic rule by "experts"; revising the present German borders within a "federal" Europe," based on a strictly hierarchical system run 10 They find a German-speaking forum in the magazines: Criticon, MUT 13 In addition, the West Berlin historian Arnulf Baring calls for military intervention in the case of unrest in "the vacuum East Europe" and sealing off the eastern border to according to socio-economic "performance" results. It is not particularly difficult to argue theoretically against such a model, as the historical tradition of the period of Nazi occupation and collaboration -the legitimation of the Right -provides, on a closer analysis of the war period, an unequivocally negative picture of fascist-dominated Europe. This negative verdict is bound to be underlined further by the examination of empirical sources, for example the planning and actually implementing the mass extermination of whole population groups; enforcing conditions of indentured or slave labour within the Nazi system. However, it is not quite so easy to refute the claims of a young group of German historians and political scientists in Berlin, Bielefeld, Bonn and Munich. They invest German fascism with positive attributes, i.e. they see it as a "revolutionary social" variant of a "secular modernization process", 14 link its "national community" (Volksgemeinschaft) with the contemporary tendency of inverting historical class analysis and exploit for their own ends those interpretations of fascist genocide which ignore the socio-economic conditions prevailing at the time. The main problem is that such well-thought-out opinion can attach itself to the theoretical body of work written by established German historians, thereby simplifying complicated conventional theories and transforming them subtly into a "progressive" and exemplary framework in order to manipulate the historical truth about many areas of Nazi domination. To illustrate this, I will begin by sketching the "modernization theories" of the 1960s and 1970s and then examine how young historians misappropriated and instrumentalized these theories. Then follows a discussion on the ideology behind the concept "Volksgemeinschaft", and also on the transformation of Nazi genocide by means of a "negative" reflection of the modernization theory. Last but not least, we shall turn to the question of how such efforts are shamelessly synthesized in public debate in an effort to Propagate an expansionist, exclusively "Grossdeutsch" view of history.
THE MODERNIZATION THEORY IN THE 1960s AND 1970s
For a considerable time large sections of Anglo-American and German research into the history of the Nazi era has been influenced by the "modernization" paradigm, that is to say, that the years between 1933 a nd 1945 were marked by a strong surge of modernizing influences in e conomic, political and cultural fields. The theory that the Nazi dictatorship gave German society a "revolutionary" shove into the "modern" era by instrumentalizing "modernization" tactics in order to introduce "regressive" (i.e. pre-1918) social structures, was formulated systematically for the first time by Ralf Dahrendorf in the mid-1960s. 15 Dahrendorf's argument was that National Socialism surmounted previous divisions of society in isolated social milieux and integrated them on a national basis, albeit unintentionally and rather as the inevitable consequence of its dictatorial system of rule: The brutal break with tradition and the thrust from behind into the era of "modernity" [. . .] are integral features of National Socialism.
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A year after Dahrendorf's book appeared, David Schoenbaum presented the first social history synthesis of the Nazi period. 17 He described national-socialist social policy as an antimodernist Utopia covered by an ideological mantle, under which the Nazis, in pursuance of the regime's goals, used industrial measures and mobilized society on an extensive basis. A "social revolution" occurred predominantly in the socio-cultural superstructure and found expression -in a scissors-like movement -in social organizations. It was primarily the Deutsche Arbeitsfront (DAF) which accelerated the process of social mobilization and "compensated" the workers for the loss of their trade union rights by affording them more social equality. In the early 1970s Henry A. Turner rounded off the "antimodern" postulate in the writings on the social and economic history of Hitler's Germany by depicting the "antimodern" Utopia of German fascism as a decisive element in its political practice. 18 The "antimodern" social stereotype of the "frontier farmer" (half-farmer, half-soldier) needed "Lebensraum" to expand. In a divided world this meant war -a war which could be fought only with the means supplied by a highly developed industrial society: "The National Socialists inevitably had to modernise in order to pursue their anti-progressive goals." 19 By so drawing on the expansionists programme of German fascism, Turner made the "ends and means" dichotomy of the German "double revolution" -which Dahrendorf had not reconciled with one another and Schoenbaum left underexposed -convincingly compatible. Various "modernization" models could now be presented as harmonious, watertight, explanatory prototypes for all kinds of microstudies and soon became uncontested among the teachers and students of modern history in West Germany.
On reflection, this development must seem all the more surprising, considering that it represented a methodological regression in modern history studies and coincided with a period of intense reflection on the role of the "modernization" concept within the interdisciplinary realms of social history. In this connection I wish to refer to the work of Jurgen Kocka and Hans-Ulrich Wehler since the 1970s. 20 Both endeavoured to purify the normative construction of the Anglo-Saxon parliamentary model of capitalism -taken from US development sociology -as a standard and the final goal of history. 21 It was placed in a somewhat social-liberal variation which took cognizance of social conflicts, argued in favour of breaking the "spell of myths" on the way to the capitalistic "Moderne", 22 and proclaimed "the democratic social state for the masses" as a model (Wehler) . 23 The framework of this argument became even more flexible and its immanently strict determinism was moderated by the adoption of the theories of Reinhard Bendix, Alexander Gerschenkorn and Barrington Moore. The latter had formulated various development models stemming from the Anglo-French "double revolution" and linked these with property rights in land and "latecomer" types of societies. To indicate the historical possibilities of contributing to the "well-being of the Republic" on a continuous basis was considered necessary without, however, having to refer to "any single social group" as the moving force. 24 What Kocka and Wehler concocted was neither a functioning legitimation-model for the ruling elites, nor did they want to confine themselves by referring unduly to the working class or even 20 the labour movement. In the last resort, this West German variant of the modernization model claimed an unrestricted sphere of activity for the ambitions of the more or less "non-institutional", social-liberal intelligentsia of the 1970s. Wehler's typification of dichotomies in "modernity" and "tradition" 25 were, however, especially questionable, as they were supposed to isolate single indicative factors in the transition to developed capitalism and enable the testing of their potential modernization content. In this respect, Tipps' vehement critique was not taken to heart, namely that modernity/tradition represent asymmetrical concepts: as soon as "modernization" is used as an historical ideal, everything else which does not correspond to it is excluded as "traditional". The hint given by North American historians that the newest intellectual progressive Utopia can be traced back to Herbert Spencer's Social-Darwinist premisses 27 was not registered by the leading lights of German social sciences, even critical reflections from within their own ranks concerning the Janus-like consequences of "modernization" did not impair the ardour of the Bielefeld protagonists in propagating their faith in a form of historical progress tempered by state intervention measures. agrarian societies to developed industrial societies, etc. 29 Above all, the objection raised by the social scientist Jens Alber was of foremost importance. At the end of the 1980s Alber confronted the "modernization theory" with its functional context, using indicators borrowed from US development sociology and thus contributing significantly to the debate. 30 He proved that no socio-economical modernizing effects -in the framework of a capitalistic-democratic model of progress -grew out of the Nazi system. The model based on Alber's own indicators (urbanization, incomes structure, education, traditional family ties, gender roles, recruitment of elites, social and legal security, wage income, barriers to mobility) produced the following: the Nazi dictatorship was a specific response of the ruling elites to the world economic crisis. This variant -"solving" a crisis of the political system within a fully-developed "Moderne" -meant, in effect, a demodernization if one starts from the basis of the "capitalistic progress model".
The main currents in modern history studies were not, however, affected by this immanently methodological refutation. On the contrary, up to the mid-1980s Wehler's dichotomy-schema was used unreservedly to remove, above all, the social policy and planning decisions of the Nazis from their contexts. Broszat in an essay which caused no little controversy, 33 to begin a period of "historicization" -hitherto not attempted -of the years between 1933 and 1945. Broszat argued that the "morality of dismay" and presenting National Socialism "as a negative standard for political enlightenment" were long since redundant and had been pushed into the background by other catastrophes in world history. In future, one must absent oneself from black and white schemata and work out sophisticated, general historical models, in order to give due place of honour to those grey zones and blurred dividing lines which comprise a good part of all historical facts. Everything which emerged from the ruling apparat of the Nazis cannot be ascribed in all cases to the undoubtedly dreadful overall balance of the epoch. For example, the Deutsche Arbeitsfront worked out a general people's insurance plan with index-linked pensions guaranteed by the state and so contributed to "the social insurance legislation of the Federal Republic in the 1950s, a remarkable achievement for the time". 34 Here one can see, Broszat continued, a proximity to the Beveridge plan, published during the war. These achievements, along with other improvements in social legislation, are evidence of an amazing "thrust of progressive social welfare innovations pursued by DAF, despite its rather manipulative and repressive functions." According to Broszat, such an example demonstrates that "the countless modernizing endeavours" between 1933 and 1945 "cannot be divested of historical significance just on the basis of being linked to the Nazi regime."
"Not everything that happened in the Nazi era and had historically far-reaching effects can be said to have merely served the dictatorial and inhumane power-objectives of the regime." By using arguments based predominantly on social policy, Broszat made clear in 1985 in which direction his "historicization" postulate was aimed and by drawing attention to allegedly social-progressive elements, the Nazi dictatorship was to be reclaimed for the "Moderne" and should take its place in the continuum of the development towards the German social state. With this conceptual fixation, Broszat's "historicization" postulate comprised in the intervening years a core ingredient of German historical revisionism.
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When we examine the main "historicizing" argument of Broszat's, namely DAF ("social support of the German people") on the basis of its planning documentation and similar material, we reach the conclusion that we are dealing with mystification. The "social support", a social and political programme for post-war Germany, was used during the war as a camouflaged national loan to siphon off purchasing power in order to kick-start the economies of the conquered European countries after a German victory. 36 Under this premiss, a socio-politic austerity course, retained since the period of emergency laws passed by the presidential cabinets in the Weimar Republic, was to be adjusted by means of socio-racist measures to the conditions of a transformed society enjoying full employment. Concerning the expected compensation for the vicissitudes befalling wage earners, all eventualities were to be guarded against -none, however, that might lead to egalitarian social insurance for all. Only "Germans" and "persons of German blood" were to receive the blessings of this "social support", 37 but not, however, the millions of foreign workers and those in forced labour who had until then enjoyed the benefits of the Reich's social security system, albeit often formally and on the basis of their "racial origin". But also for migratory workers entitled to claim benefit in the "competitive society" there were preconditions which ran contrary to normal capitalist-parliamentarian concepts of social policy: general compulsory labour up to 65 years and over; exclusion from the system for "malingerers" and "strikers" after sentencing by the justice authorities or "social courts of honour". The model was based on cost calculations which had place neither for the "rearing of inferior humans" nor the "building of institutions for idiots".
38 These socio-political models of reorganization were linked closely with general conscript labour and socio-racist extermination technology. They also represented a consciously formulated rejection of all previous development tendencies in capitalistic social policy as it had been understood in the modernization theories of West German social historians.
Taking the background of power politics into account, Broszat's attempts at "historicization" proved to be an ideological construction which made a critical historicization impossible. His desire to present an affirmative historicization of the most significant showpiece of fascist social planning can certainly be traced back to an inadequate knowledge of the source materials, to methodological mistakes and to analogies which cannot be drawn. These inconsistencies on the part of such a skilled and empirically competent expert such as Broszat can, in the last resort, only be explained by external pressure exerted on him to conform. What he does not offer is a critical analysis of the above-mentioned model, which was designed by the Nazis to reorganize and radicalize 36 Zitelmann. Seven years ago he completed his dissertation (Darmstadt), in which he threw light on Hitler's system of thought by using the dictator's writings and those written about him. 40 Accordingly, Hitler was a social revolutionary in a genuine sense; he strove consciously and systematically for a modernization of society and did not do so involuntarily in the prosecution of his backward-looking goals, as stated by Dahrendorf, Schoenbaum and Turner. Starting from some SocialDarwinist basic views, the "Ftihrer", in Zitelmann's eyes, committed himself to more equality of opportunity in the "national community" and egalitarian social policies, and spoke in favour of a levelling process in a post-bourgeois society marked by social advancement and performance-orientation. This "modernism" was truly Hitler's ultimate goal, and in attaining it, he employed an expansionist foreign policy ("Lebensraum"), especially in the East. 41 As we see, Zitelmann had merely turned the means-and-ends dichotomy of the prevailing modernization concept right round, thereby generalizing the impulse offered by Broszat. Zitelmann linked these methodological steps with a reinterpretation of the conventional revolution concept which he borrowed from Ernst Nolte. 42 From the politically suspect "normative" aspects of revolutionary history Zitelmann separated the "empirical" ones and identified them with long-term modernization trends from US sociology, then transmitting them to the period of the Nazi dictatorship. Now the Nazi era was presented as part of a global "fundamental revolution" in modernization. These intellectual outpourings were underlaid exclusively with historical ideas -by falling back on the "phenomenological selfwriting" of Hitler's world of ideas. In the case of so much methodological and ideological reductionism, a far-reaching identification with the subject under investigation (Hitler) could not fail to materialize. Hitler's remarks concerning the mobilization of social-imperialistic sentiment in order to compensate the lower classes for the fact that their social advancement was still being blocked is re-evaluated as being an expression of more "equality of opportunity" -a concept Hitler demonstrably never used. All axioms central to "modernization" are derived from this semantic counterfeit: "social mobility", "egalitarian tendencies in social policy", "social welfarism", etc. In the course of this questionable argumentation untold violence is also done to the source materials so that Hitler's alleged social levelling strategy can be divested of its violent, destructive and inhumane content. It is therefore all the more astonishing and worthy of explanation that Zitelmann's book, published in 1987 and in an enlarged edition two years later, was enormously successful. The explanation is simple: Zitelmann turned a key-model designed by leading historians 180 degrees around and claimed it for the New Right. Ultranationalistic journalists became his imitators, his ideas were described as being like a reissue of the "German Socialism" of Gregor Strasser, 43 and the social question was made an integral part of neo-racist, right-wing extremism. Zitelmann subsequently worked at the Free University in Berlin, from 1992 in the publishing house of Ullstein/Propyla'en and attracted a group of young revisionists, who, from different starting-points, all strove to popularize a new view of history. At first there was collaboration with other biographer-historians, who supplemented the "revolutionized" portrait of Hitler a la Zitelmann with further "representatives of social progress" from within the NSDAP leadership (Franz W. Seidler on Fritz Todt, Ronald Smelser on Robert Ley, and later, Gerhard Paul on Josef Burckel as a type of "red" Gauleiter). 44 Afterwards there was also cooperation between Zitelmann and the young political scientists and historians who had previously worked in "extremism/ terrorism" research projects funded by the Federal Ministry of the Interior. They attacked the "antifascist syndrome" of the New Left, thus removing an essential barrier to the "national" integration of right-wing extremism (Herbert Ammon, Uwe Backes and Eckhard Jesse). 45 Zitelmann heads a department in the newspaper Die Welt (Springer concern) since December 1993 and is determined, with his comrades-in-arms, some of whom even come from the SPD, the unions and the "BUndnis 90/Griinen", 46 The second phase of this campaign began in 1991 with the publication of an anthology edited by Zitelmann and a former pupil of Kocka's, Michael. Prinz.
48 Now the sluice gates were opened, more and more aspects of the Nazi dictatorship "examined", mosaic pieces of so-called "social progressivity" collated in order to transform completely the conventional historical opinion on the structure and social policies of the Nazi regime. The NSDAP itself underwent a metamorphosis and became, finally, the first "popular party of protest" (Jiirgen W. Falter).
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A "double modernization" relating to the period before and after 1945 was bestowed on education, science, town planning, psychiatry, the school system, etc. 50 The fact that officers with a technical background serving with the Nazi forces were given promotion outside the previous caste-system of the officer corps was interpreted as an indication of egalitarian tendencies within the Wehrmacht. 51 The experts in structural history from the Bielefeld school now came into their own: they ransacked the complex theoretical edifices of their teachers, disposed themselves of the latters' social-liberal intentions and implanted all historical fields of study in the procrustean bed of dichotomies and stratified modernization trends. Willi Oberkrome distanced himself from the warmongering and racist goals of fascist "national customs and traditions", but described the methods employed to promote tradition as an innovatory contribution to broadening the "progressive" overall balance.
32 Michael Prinz busied himself with the balance of Nazi social policy itself. 53 According to him, the "Law for the Regulation of National Labour" (1934) was indeed reactionary from the workers' point of view, but "ahead of its time" (at the point of application). The social status of women, too, underwent considerable improvement in the sense that their double functions as production and reproduction workers became stabilized. Despite all racist distortions, the social policies of the Weimar Republic were long-lived and contributed -see, for example, DAFto a remarkable rise in economic efficiency. The DAF, reluctantly pressed into carrying out trade union functions, clawed back concessions from industry to an extent hitherto unknown. Without doubt, the costs of the "modernization push" were inordinately high. None the less, the benefits accruing from it were "new freedoms". The ensuing and enormous homogenization tendency within social structures is irrefutable today and must lead to a new overall evaluation of the epoch. So much for the revisionists' case. By taking the main lines of argument in social history scholarship, by trimming and distorting them beyond recognition, the revisionists are able to erect a system of "scientific" rehabilitation by these and other means of shameless historical propaganda.
THE IDEOLOGY OF "NATIONAL COMMUNITY"
The modernization theory of the New Right asserts that German fascism completely destroyed the social milieu(x) of the working class and, in a revolutionary upheaval in society, integrated wage earners into the "national community". 54 These findings were bound to find favour with empirically-minded colleagues, considering that they had been confronted with the propagandistic hagiography from the GDR to the effect that the working class, under the leadership of the German Communist Party (KPD), had carried out broad resistance to Nazi oppression. 55 In addition, many regional or specific studies had produced evidence of the contrary. Since the beginning of the 1980s these developments gave weight to the increasingly popular thesis that while the middle class had brought Hitler to power, the workers had kept him there. 56 Finally, a conventional wisdom emerged and proceeded to exclude the history of resistance to fascism from the structural history of the working class. In this respect, highly selective and methodologically questionable series of biographical interviews were presented as representing class-identity in its entirety. 57 To the same end, single events 58 or election results were generalized without analytical exactitude. 59 Also taken at face value was the unprecedented level of propaganda under the Nazi dictatorship ("second reality") when it proclaimed the integration of the "toiling masses". 60 In using Tim Mason's example, I will apply myself to the question of where the historical truth lies between the two extremes of resistance myths and integration legends. For the moment, however, I want to emphasize once more that in many cases the methodological premisses of the New Right's modernization theories have deformed the extremely complex problems of the history of labour during the Third Reich beyond recognition.
SOLIDARITY WITH A RENEWED CONCEPT OF A POWERFUL PRUSSIAN-GERMAN STATE
In the meantime, the present school of revisionist historians, whose argumentation ran for a long period on socio-political lines, have gained Europe", it makes more sense first to discard the lilliputian aims of former German foreign policy 68 and to participate without illusions in the rigorous planning of a reconstructed "Eurasia", giving ample thought to hegemony over the newly emerged small states of Eastern and SouthEastern Europe.
Passages of this kind can be read in the publications of the renowned Ullstein publishing house, where Zitelmann has been working as a leading editor for the past few years. Historical writings with a similar revisionist message are also issued by Siedler-Verlag 69 and receive official government recognition. 70 All these tendencies can be associated closely with a general offensive against the entire social history scholarship of the 1970s. It is high time, the Right argues, for the social historians of the 1970s to vacate their prominent positions; the "priority of German home affairs" demands their removal if the emphasis of German historical science is to manifest itself by dealing with problems of international relations. 71 Established historians look on from the sidelines or prepare themselves for new tasks -their contribution to the "rewriting" of the history of the GDR has already produced disastrous results. 72 With a few exceptions, 73 the leading exponents of German historical studies have kept silent about the misappropriation of their methodological paradigma; silent, too, when these models are integrated into the "strong state" concept which now enjoys increasing social acceptance and threatens to condemn critical historiography about the Nazi dictatorship to oblivion.
FASCIST GENOCIDE AS THE STARTING-POINT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF A "NEGATIVE" MODERNIZATION THEORY
In the epistemological models used to provide an historical reconstruction of the Nazi dictatorship and examined in these pages, an analysis of mass extermination practices found no place. The very fact of the mass murders is sui generis a provocation to the proponents of theories of "modernization" and "national community". Therefore, they play down the entire subject 74 or exclude it. If it is considered at all, genocide is afforded a minor role in the accumulatively vicious internal wranglings of the Nazi elites and, at the most, analysed merely at the highest decision-making level. This model-conditioned exclusion has the inverse consequence that in researching the background to, and the actual steps taken, in executing the genocide policy, the totalitarianism concept still goes unchallenged and is constantly widened by new facets. 75 The mass liquidation of institutionalized patients, Jews, gypsies, Soviet POWs and "elements" deemed outside the "community" is interpreted as a singular lapse on the part of a civilized people, a lapse which developed out of the immanent logic of totalitarian rule, and, as a consequence, can be explained solely on these terms or with reference to the regime's racist ideology. The Nazi murder-machine is thus presented as a kind of "black box" outside historical comprehension, 76 provided one leaves aside the ahistorical generalization of racism and antisemitism as eternal problems. According to the revisionists, fascist mass murder also defies comprehension because the victims could not understand it either and it is improper to take a different point of view than that of the victims.
Sometimes the tendency to link totalitarianism theories with conceptions of modernization is clear. In this respect, the studies of the ex-Communist sociologist Zygmunt Bauman are beginning to attract disciples. 77 few and far between. This statement of fact stands in sharp contrast to the following: in the 1970s and 1980s an extremely productive, differentiated and critical historiography of the Nazi regime was established and did not allow itself to be diverted by the deficits and compulsion to justify oneself engendered by the "methods debate" initiated by Kocka, Wehler and Broszat. That this happened at all is due in no small part to Tim Mason, the English historian who committed suicide in Rome two years ago. Other innovatory impulses came from modern history scholars in West Berlin and Bochum. Mason's annotated volume of documents, issued in 1975 on the "Working-class and 'National Community' ", explicitly set out to detect class conflicts hidden behind the symbols of "national community". 90 Confrontations between workers and capital had not stopped after the German labour movement and the status quo it supported had been destroyed. Mason, holding that class conflict manifested itself in other ways, expressedly indicated that this terrain was now where the usual social, economical and political processes took place. In doing so, he was conscious of the fact that his perspective repeated a view of radicalized class struggle as seen from above. Precisely because of this angle Mason was able to show how fully novel examples of interaction between the civil service, entrepreneurs and workers originated -the "national community" myth was stripped of its mantle. Mason found enough material to document working-class nonconformity towards the regime in the entire pre-war period: [1935] [1936] , the old open forms of struggle; 1937-1938, in the debate about uncontrollable staff fluctuation. The latter provoked a momentous struggle for power between state functionaries dealing with labour and social policy matters respectively. These contradictions at the top strengthened in turn the willingness to risk a war, thus instrumentalizing old social-imperialistic goals. The self-producing actionism against tyrannical rule is turned upside-down in Mason's account, i.e. it appears as the product of conflicts which have their origins essentially on the factory floor. In the following years Mason formulated more comparative questions and directed his attention directly to the social and subjective behavioural structures of the working class. From the workers' perspective Mason tried to resolve the question to what extent informal "mass resistance" ("Arbeiteropposition") or a "consensus" attitude "purchased" by progressive social measures can be discerned. 
